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The Two Hundred Million Dollar Question: Were Letters of
Credit as Good as Cash in the MF Global LiquidationT
INTRODUCTION
On October 31, 2011, MF Global, Inc. ("MF Global") went
bankrupt in the eighth-largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.' MF Global
was a major futures commission merchant ("FCM") that traded
commodity futures contracts on behalf of customers in the commodity
futures market.2 During the European debt crisis, MF Global Holding
Co., the parent company of MF Global, got into trouble as a result of
prior trading in European sovereign debt.3 MF Global had illegally
used customer funds to pay its trading partners to meet overdrafts
and collateral calls.' After the bankruptcy, $1.6 billion of customer
funds were found to be missing.' In the MF Global liquidation, it
seemed that customers would not be able to recover all of the funds
they lost.'
In a bankruptcy of a commodity broker, the bankruptcy trustee
pools customer property and then distributes it pro rata among
* 0 2014 Valerie M. Hughes.
1. Richard Strasser, "Come Monday, It'll Be All Right": Buffett, the U.S. Financial
Crisis and the Need for a Reliable, Private Liquidity Consortium, 10 DEPAUL Bus. & COM.
L.J. 291, 344 (2012).
2. See Anita K. Krug, Escaping Entity-Centrism in Financial Services Regulation, 113
COLUM. L. REv. 2039,2068 (2013).
3. See id. at 2072.
4. See RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R42091, THE MF GLOBAL
BANKRUPTCY, MISSING CUSTOMER FUNDS, AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 1 (2013),
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42091.pdf. In the collateral call, MF Global's
creditors required MF Global to post higher collateral either because of an increased
credit risk of the bonds MF Global had bought or because MF Global's credit rating
dropped. See id. at 2.
5. See Krug, supra note 2, at 2074.
6. See Ben Protess, MF Global Customers Will Recover All They Lost, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Nov. 5, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/mf-global-customers-
will-recover-all-they-lost/ (quoting Judge Martin Glenn, a bankruptcy judge who handled
the case and stated that "[a]t the outset of the case, nobody thought that customers would
recover everything they lost"). The bankruptcy trustee has recovered all missing funds,
and customers have finally recovered their lost money through the bankruptcy proceeding.
See id.; Roger Parloff, How MF Global's "Missing" $1.5 Billion Was Lost-and Found,
FORTUNE (Nov. 15, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/11/15/how-mf-globals-missing-1-5-
billion-was-lost-and-found/.
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customers.' During the MF Global bankruptcy proceedings, two
customers, ConocoPhillips and Koch Supply & Trading ("Koch"),
argued that the letters of credit' they posted as margin9 for
commodity trades with MF Global should not be considered part of
the customer property that the trustee pooled in the bankruptcy. 0
ConocoPhillips had $205 million at stake in letters of credit held by
MF Global at the time of .the liquidation, and Koch had $20 million."
By avoiding characterization of the letters of credit as customer
property, ConocoPhillips and Koch could avoid possible liability to
MF Global's estate while also receiving a larger share of the customer
property. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC")
argued in the litigation that one of its regulations meant that the face
value of letters of credit constituted customer property in a
bankruptcy.12 ConocoPhillips and Koch raised numerous arguments
that the court should ignore the CFTC's interpretation of the
regulation, including arguments that the CFTC's opinion was not
entitled to deference and that the CFTC's interpretation conflicted
with and did not preempt state law. 3
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 766(h) (2012).
8. A letter of credit is a promise on the part of the issuer (generally a bank) to pay to
the beneficiary the amount stated in the letter if the applicant defaults. See infra notes 63-
65 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of margin in futures trades, see infra notes 34-66 and
accompanying text.
10. See ConocoPhillips' Brief in Opposition to the Trustee's Amended Motion to
Confirm his Treatment of Letters of Credit Provided by ConocoPhillips at 1,
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Giddens (In re MF Global Inc.), No. 12 Civ. 6014 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
23, 2012) [hereinafter ConocoPhillips Brief], available at http://www.cftc.gov/
ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/conocobriefoppositionl12812.pdf;
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion of Koch Supply & Trading, LP for Summary
Judgment at 1, Koch Supply & Trading, LP v. Giddens (In re MF Global Inc.), No. 11-
2790 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Koch Memorandum], available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/mfglobalmemoisokstsj
motion1026.pdf.
11. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 5-6; Koch Memorandum, supra note
10, at 2.
12. See Reply Brief of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in Support of the
Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Koch Supply & Trading, LP v. Giddens,
No. 12-05596 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/
ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/024cftcreplygiddensOlO7l3.pdf; Reply
Brief of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in Support of the Trustee's Motion
to Confirm at 1-2, ConocoPhillips Co. v. Giddens, No. 12 Civ. 06014 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3,
2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/
cftcreplyl203l2.pdf.
13. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 2, 16-18.
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The case ultimately settled, leaving unresolved the issue of
whether courts will treat letters of credit posted as margin the same as
cash margin in bankruptcy proceedings involving FCMs. This issue
nevertheless remains important because of the amount of money at
stake in such a bankruptcy, the likelihood of another FCM
bankruptcy, and the possible impact that a ruling on this issue could
have on general letter of credit law.
In terms of the money at stake, FCMs are often huge firms. For
example, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Barclays, Citigroup, Deutsche
Bank, and Credit Suisse are all FCMs with billions of dollars in
adjusted net capital.14 MF Global also had billions of dollars in assets,
and its bankruptcy was the eighth largest in U.S. history." When
companies like ConocoPhillips have hundreds of millions of dollars in
the form of letters of credit with these firms, the determination of
whether these letters of credit are customer property will have
significant financial consequences.
In addition, the MF Global liquidation is not the only recent
bankruptcy of a large FCM: Peregrine lost $215 million in customer
funds less than a year after MF Global filed for bankruptcy.'"
Terrence A. Duffy, the Executive Chairman and President of CME
Group, the industry's self-regulating body in charge of regulating MF
Global, said Peregrine's fraud, coming on the heels of MF Global's
bankruptcy, "has shaken the very core of our industry."" As shown
by the occurrence of the Peregrine bankruptcy, there is a distinct
14. See Selected FCM Financial Data as of May 31, 2014, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@financialdataforfcms/
documents/file/fcmdata0514.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2014).
15. See Krug, supra note 2, at 2074; Strasser, supra note 1, at 344.
16. See Halah Touryalai, Peregrine Files for Bankruptcy After $215 Million Goes
Missing, Where Were the Regulators?, FORBES (July 11, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/07/11/peregrine-files-for-bankruptcy-
after-215m-goes-missing-where-were-the-regulators/.
17. Examining the Futures Markets: Responding to the Failures of MF Global and
Peregrine Financial Group: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition and Forestry,
112th Cong. 33 (2012) (statement of Terrence A. Duffy, Executive Chairman and
President, CME Inc.). Prior to these recent bankruptcies, another large FCM, Refco, filed
for bankruptcy in 2005. See Jenny Anderson, Refco Sells Futures Unit and Seeks
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/18/
business/18refco.htmi. The 1980s also saw some high-profile FCM insolvencies, including
Volume Investors Corporation's default in 1985. See Andrea M. Corcoran & Susan C.
Ervin, Maintenance of Market Strategies in Futures Broker Insolvencies: Futures Position
Transfers from Troubled Firms, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849, 852 (1987).
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likelihood that future FCM bankruptcies will arise and revive the
issue of how to treat letters of credit posted as margin.'"
A determination on this issue could also have broader
implications for letter of credit law because the treatment of letters of
credit in bankruptcy could affect their viability as margin deposits in
commodity futures trading." Based on bankruptcy and other policy
considerations, the CFTC could also prohibit the use of letters of
credit as margin for futures and options trades, as the CFTC has
already prohibited the use of letters of credit as margin for swaps.20
Although the parties raised numerous arguments in the
litigation, this Recent Development focuses on the question of
administrative deference. If this litigation had gone to trial, the
trustee should have prevailed based on the plain meaning of "full
proceeds of a letter of credit" in 17 C.F.R. § 190.08(a)(1)(i)(E).
However, if the court determined that "proceeds" had no plain
meaning, the court would have to consider whether to give deference
to the CFTC's interpretation of the regulation. In that case, the court
should apply Auer deference 2 1 to the agency's decision and uphold
the CFTC's interpretation. Even if a court did not apply Auer
18. However, in the wake of the MF Global and Peregrine bankruptcies, the CFTC
has written regulations addressing some of the regulatory loopholes that contributed to
those bankruptcies. See Enhancing Protections Afforded Customers and Customer Funds
Held by Futures Commission Merchants and Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 78 Fed.
Reg. 68,506, 68,572 (Nov. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 3, 22, 30, 140)
(eliminating the "Alternative Method" for calculating the secured amount that an FCM
must have in reserves for a transaction on a foreign exchange, reducing the amount of
funds an FCM can hold in non-U.S. depositories, and reducing the commingling of
customer funds); see also Ann Saphir, U.S. CFTC Looks Set to Keep Margin Rules Despite
Industry Outcry, REUTERS (June 25, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/07/25/financial-regulation-cftc-margins-idUSLINOFV1 HD20130725. These
regulations address many of the actions that MF Global took in the days preceding its
bankruptcy that led to the loss of customer funds, and these regulations may help to
reduce the risk of a FCM bankruptcy in the future. See Parloff, supra note 6 (describing
MF Global's use of the Alternative Method to take customer funds to cover its proprietary
investment positions and the problems associated with the approximately $725 million in
customer funds that were trapped in the U.K. after the bankruptcy).
19. See Supplementary Information, 48 Fed. Reg. 8716, 8718 (Mar. 1, 1983) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 190(a)(1)(i)(E)).
20. See Statement of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in Response to
ConocoPhillips' Motion to Withdraw the Reference at 3, In re MF Global Inc. No. 12-
06014 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/vcm/groups/public
/@newsroom/documents/file/cftcstatement082312.pdf (stating that the CFTC continues to
allow, but does not encourage, the use of letters of credit as margin in futures and options
contracts).
21. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). Under Auer deference, a court defers to an
agency's interpretation of its own regulation. See id. at 461.
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deference, the court would probably find that the letters of credit
should receive the same treatment as cash margin because of strong
policy considerations.
The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I gives background on
commodity futures trading and the CFTC. Part II discusses the
litigation and its settlement prior to a determination on the merits as
well as the parties' arguments in support of their positions. Part III
analyzes the CFTC's interpretation of its own regulation, 17 C.F.R.
§ 190.08, and argues that this interpretation would most likely have
been entitled to Auer deference if the case had gone to trial. Part IV
discusses the policy implications of this issue and argues that the
trustee. should have prevailed if the case had gone to trial. This Part
also discusses possible negative impact on letter of credit law that
could result from treating letters of credit the same as cash in
bankruptcy. However, these concerns do not outweigh the equitable
and legal arguments in favor of the trustee's position in the MF
Global liquidation. A brief conclusion follows.
I. BACKGROUND ON COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND THE
CFTC
This Part provides background information on commodity
futures trading in general. Subpart A describes commodity futures
trading. Subpart B discusses the CFTC and its regulation of
commodity broker bankruptcies.
A. Commodity Futures Trading
FCMs often serve as brokers for trades on the commodity futures
market.22 Generally, a futures contract creates an obligation for the
purchaser to buy, at a price agreed upon today, a specified amount of
a commodity at a determined point in the future.23 In a physically-
settled futures contract, the seller of the contract is obligated to make
delivery at the date specified. 24 More frequently, instead of taking
delivery of the commodity, a trader in the commodity futures market
offsets a futures contract by later making an equal and opposite
22. See Jill Gustafson & Anne E. Melley, Who Must Register as Merchants, Brokers,
Advisors, and Pool Operators, in 7 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 13:2
(2014).
23. See Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures
Industry-History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 59, 62 (1991).
24. See id.
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trade.' For example, if a trader enters into a contract to buy a certain
amount of wheat in October, the trader can speculate. by later
entering into a contract to sell that amount of wheat in October.2 6 If
the price of wheat increases in the time between when the trader
enters into the first contract and the second contract, then the trader
makes a profit.27 This system of offsetting contracts allows non-end
users, such as financial entities, to participate in the market.'
Traders in commodity futures include hedgers as well as
speculators. Hedgers are generally those who produce or use the
goods that are sold on the futures market. 29 Hedgers use futures
contracts to insure against loss when there is fluctuation in the price
of the commodities they buy or sell.30 For example, a merchandiser or
producer of a commodity may own inventory in a commodity and
could hedge against the risk of the price of the commodity going
down by entering a futures contract to sell the commodity at a certain
price. In addition, if a party must buy a commodity, such as a
producer of livestock buying grain, the party can buy futures contracts
to hedge, or insure, against an increase in the price of grain that
would otherwise threaten business.32 However, hedgers represent a
small proportion of commodity traders, and ninety-five percent of all
futures contracts are offset rather than delivered.
Margin is vital to commodity futures trading, though it serves a
different function than margin in securities trading. In securities
trading, margin represents the minimum amount that a buyer of a
25. 1 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES
REGULATION § 1.02[4], at 28 (2004).
26. Id.
27. See id. § 1.02[4], at 28-29.
28. The debate over whether speculation in the commodity futures market harms the
economy by making commodity prices more volatile has continued for decades. See id.
§ 1.03[4], at 127, 129 (discussing the "debate between 'good' investing and 'bad'
speculation" and referring to non-hedging traders in commodity markets as "investors"
rather than as "speculators"); Dr. Evil, or Drivel? The Charge-Sheet Against Commodity
Speculators Is Flimsy, ECONOMIST (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.economist.com/
node/17465323.
29. Bd. of Trade v. L.A. Kinsey Co., 130 F. 507, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1904).
30. Id. ("The object of such hedging is to insure against loss by fluctuation in the
market in the commodity which the principal is carrying, or which he has sold in advance
of purchase and manufacture upon a time contract.").
31. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 25, § 1.03[2], at 120.
32. See Annotation, Nature and Validity of "Hedging" Transactions on the
Commodity Market, 20 A.L.R. ANN. 1422, 1423 (1922).
33. 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 25, § 1.02[4], at 28. A common hedging
alternative for producers and end users of commodities is a "forward contract," in which a
sale occurs immediately but delivery is delayed. See id. § 1.02[3], at 23-24.
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security must give to a broker in order for the buyer to take title to
the securities.3 4 The broker lends the buyer the remaining amount
needed to buy the security. In commodity futures trading, margin
secures the obligations of buyers and sellers. 6 Margin serves as a
deposit that customers on both sides of the trade (both buyers and
sellers) make toward the total price of the futures contract.37 In
contrast to securities trading, title to a commodity does not transfer
until the customer provides the full contract price for the trade, and a
commodity broker does not lend money to the customer.38
Commodity exchanges determine the amount of margin that must be
posted for each trade that occurs on the exchange. 39 The amount of
margin an exchange requires varies "depending on the stage of the
transaction, the nature of the trading involved, and the volatility of
market prices."4 "Initial margin" represents the deposit that a buyer
or seller in a futures trade must make in order to enter into a futures
contract."
While the exchange sets the level of margin required for each
trade, other entities are also involved in determining how much
margin a customer must post in order to complete a trade. One such
entity is a clearinghouse, which conducts trades on an exchange and
serves the important function of making futures contracts fungible.42
A clearinghouse makes contracts fungible by matching identical,
offsetting futures contracts and then "substitut[ing] itself for the
direct parties, eliminating any need for a prospective offsetter to
search out his original counterpart."4 3 If a party to a futures contract
defaults, the clearinghouse may be obligated to pay losses to the other
party (buyer or seller)." Commodity traders must trade through
FCMs, and FCMs conduct trades with clearinghouses.45
34. Id. § 1.02[13], at 110.
35. Id.
36. See Markham, supra note 23, at 63 ("By imposing margin requirements, the
clearinghouse seeks to assure that the contracting parties will meet their obligations, so
that it will never be required to fulfill its guaranty.").
37. 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 25, § 1.02[13], at 111.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 1.02[131, at 112.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 1.02[131, at 111.
42. See id. § 1.02[5], at 29.
43. Id.
44. See id. § 1.02[131, at 113.
45. See Markham, supra note 23, at 63.
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To reduce the risk that either party to a trade will default,
clearinghouses require FCMs to post margin above the initial margin
required by the exchange.' This type of margin is a "variation" or
"maintenance" margin and depends on market movement.47 As the
price of the underlying commodity changes on a day-to-day basis,
each trader's position will show a loss or a profit.' Based on this
fluctuation, each trader's position is "marked-to-market" every day to
determine what the trader's gain or loss is for that day.49 If the trader
has a loss, then the FCM must post additional margin commensurate
with the loss sustained, and if the trader has a profit, the FCM may
make withdrawals on behalf of the trader from the initial margin
posted. 0
FCMs have the initial "responsibility for any trading losses
sustained and not honored by its customers," and the clearinghouse
only becomes liable for the trade if the FCM "is unable to satisfy
those obligations."' Margin often must be posted quickly, as
clearinghouses can make margin calls overnight or more than once a
day.52 FCMs, therefore, may have to post billions of dollars in margin
overnight in the case of a market crash, as occurred in 1987.11 Because
the FCM is liable to the clearinghouse even if a customer defaults,
FCMs require their customers to post margin with them.54 This
margin secures the margin that the FCM has posted with the
clearinghouse on the customer's behalf.5 To better protect itself, the
FCM can require higher margin rates from customers than the
clearinghouse requires from the FCM.* In addition, a commodity
broker can sue a customer for any amount owed in an unmet margin
call, as the factual background of Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor 7 illustrated." FCMs can also use the customer
46. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 25, § 1.02[131, at 113.
47. See Markham, supra note 23, at 64.
48. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 25, § 1.02[13], at 114.
49. See id.
50. See id. § 1.02[13], at 112,114.
51. Id. § 1.02[13], at 112.
52. See Markham, supra note 23, at 65.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 65-66.
57. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
58. See id. at 837-41.
283
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
margin that they hold to earn interest.for themselves through other
investments.5 9
Generally, FCMs require small customers to post cash as
margin." In contrast, FCMs allow larger customers to instead post
standby letters of credit as margin,6 1 as ConocoPhillips and Koch both
did with MF Global.6 2 An obligor in virtually any type of transaction
can use a standby letter of credit to back up a payment obligation.
Traditionally, a standby letter of credit provides a "cash-like
assurance of payment in the event of nonperformance."' The party
making the undertaking to perform, the applicant, obtains the letter
of credit from a bank, the issuer, in favor of the party to whom
performance is owed, the beneficiary. In the case of commodity
futures trading, the customer is the applicant, the issuer is the
applicant's bank, and the commodity broker is the beneficiary of the
standby letter of credit. The beneficiary can draw on the letter of
credit in the case of nonperformance.6 6 In the context of commodity
trading, nonperformance is a customer's default, which is the
customer's inability to meet the FCM's margin call.
The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") governs letters of
credit under state law in states that have adopted it." Under the
UCC, a beneficiary of a letter of credit, such as a commodity futures
broker, could only recover from an issuer the value of a letter of
credit that "appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and
conditions of the letter of credit."6 8 In the context of commodity
trading, the terms and conditions of the letter would most likely
specify that the value of the letter is due to the commodity broker in
the event of a customer default, as the ConocoPhillips and Koch
59. 17 C.F.R. § 1.29 (2014) ("The investment of customer funds in [qualified
investments] shall not prevent the futures commission merchant or derivatives clearing
organization so investing such funds from receiving and retaining as its own any
incremental income or interest income resulting therefrom.").
60. See Supplementary Information, 48 Fed. Reg. 8716, 8718 (Mar. 1, 1983) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 190.08(a)(1)(i)(E)).
61. See id.
62. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 4; Koch Memorandum, supra note 10,
at 2.
63. Roslyn K. Meyers, Introduction to 5A WEST'S MCKINNEY's FORMS UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (2014).
64. See Uses of Letters of Credit (Nonsales Transactions), in INTERNATIONAL LETTER
OF CREDIT LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:23 (2014).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See Meyers, supra note 63.
68. U.C.C. § 5-108(a) (2013).
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letters specified.69 Letters of credit under the UCC expire, and the
UCC specifies when a letter of credit expires if the letter does not
specify an expiration date.70 The ConocoPhillips and Koch letters of
credit specified expiration dates that passed before the bankruptcy
proceedings, allowing ConocoPhillips and Koch to argue that the
bankruptcy trustee could not have drawn on the letters of credit
because they were expired.'
B. The CFTC and Its Regulation of Commodity Broker Bankruptcy
Under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, in a liquidation of a
commodity broker, "customer property" is pooled and distributed pro
rata to customers before other creditors are paid out from the estate.72
The Bankruptcy Code states that "the trustee shall distribute
customer property ratably to customers on the basis and to the extent
of such customers' allowed net equity claims, and in priority to all
other claims."" The Bankruptcy Code defines "customer property" as
"cash, a security, or other property, or proceeds of such ... property"
that is held by the debtor for the customer "including... property
received, acquired, or held to margin, guarantee, secure, purchase, or
sell a commodity contract." 74
The Commodity Exchange Act gives the CFTC the power to
promulgate regulations concerning the bankruptcy of commodity
brokers." In particular, the CFTC has the power, "[n]otwithstanding
Title 11 [of the Bankruptcy Code]," to determine "that certain cash,
securities, other property, or commodity contracts are to be included
in or excluded from customer property."76 Pursuant to this authority,
the CFTC has promulgated Rule 190.08, dealing with allocation of
69. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 4 ("The customer
agreement...require[d] an event of default on the part of ConocoPhillips before MF
Global [could] present any of these letters of credit or otherwise dispose of collateral.");
Koch Memorandum, supra note 10, at 2 (stating that payment under the letter of credit
was conditioned on MF Global providing the issuing bank with a "written statement that
[Koch] was in default under [the] agreement with [MF Global]").
70. U.C.C. § 5-106(c) (2013) ("If there is no stated expiration date or other provision
that determines its duration, a letter of credit expires one year after its stated date of
issuance or, if none is stated, after the date on which it is issued.").
71. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 4-5; Koch Memorandum, supra note
10, at 2.
72. 11 U.S.C. § 766(h) (2012).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 761(10).
75. 7 U.S.C. § 24 (2012).
76. Id. § 24(a).
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customer property." This rule states that customer property includes
"[t]he full proceeds of a letter of credit if such letter of credit was
received, acquired or held to margin, guarantee, secure, purchase or
sell a commodity contract.""
Before this regulation was approved, the CFTC clarified what it
meant by the "full proceeds" of a letter of credit." The CFTC stated
that, under the proposed regulation, "the trustee would be required
to draw the full value of a letter of credit posted as margin and treat
the funds received as customer property, irrespective of the margin
obligation secured thereby."so The CFTC drafted this regulation
through a standard notice and comment process,"' and it mentioned
that "[sleveral of the commentators requested that the Commission
amend its proposal to provide that letters of credit be drawn upon
only in accordance with their terms and only to the extent of the
margin owing by the depositor."82 The commentators also argued
"that the proposed rule would require a trustee to draw the full
proceeds of letters of credit irrespective of their terms even though
they generally condition payment on delivery of a certification that
additional funds are required to margin or to cover a default with
respect to a contract."8 The CFTC rejected this argument because it
wanted letters of credit to be treated the same in bankruptcy as other
forms of non-cash margin.' By allowing the trustee to draw the face
value of the letter of credit, the CFTC would not incentivize the use
of letters of credit as a means to avoid pro rata distribution of margin
funds in bankruptcy.85
With this background on commodity futures trading and the
CFTC's regulation of letters of credit in FCM bankruptcies in mind,
the specifics of the MF Global bankruptcy litigation become clearer.
II. THE PARTIES' POSITIONS IN THE LITIGATION
In the MF Global bankruptcy litigation, ConocoPhillips and
Koch made a variety of arguments to support their questionable
77. See 17 C.F.R. § 190.08 (2013).
7& Id. § 190.08(a)(1)(i)(E).
79. Supplementary Information, 48 Fed. Reg. 8716, 8718 (Mar. 1, 1983) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 190).
80. Id.
81. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).
82. Supplementary Information, 48 Fed. Reg. at 8718.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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position that letters of credit should not constitute a part of customer
property. This Part discusses the parties to this litigation and the
arguments each party made before the settlement. Subpart A
describes the factual background of the litigation including the
circumstances surrounding MF Global's bankruptcy. Subpart B
discusses each party's main arguments in the litigation.
A. ConocoPhillips, Koch Supply & Trading, and MF Global's
Liquidation
ConocoPhillips and Koch Supply & Trading were two large
customers of MF Global at the time it filed for bankruptcy." MF
Global allowed only nine of its tens of thousands of customers to post
letters of credit as margin, and ConocoPhillips and Koch were two of
those nine customers. 7 ConocoPhillips had a total of $205 million in
standby letters of credit with MF Global that the bankruptcy trustee
claimed were customer property." These letters of credit constituted
$135 million in letters of credit for domestic commodity trading, $60
million in letters of credit for foreign trading, and a $10 million letter
of credit posted by ConocoPhillips Canada.89 The foreign letters of
credit expired by their terms on November 23, 2011, after MF Global
filed for bankruptcy on October 31, 2011.0 Koch had one letter of
credit with MF Global at the time of the bankruptcy, and that letter
of credit had a face value of $20 million." That letter expired on
December 31, 2011,92 just two months after MF Global filed for
bankruptcy.93
86. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11; infra text accompanying notes 87-101.
87. See Koch Supply & Trading, LP v. Giddens (In re MF Global Inc.), 484 B.R. 18,
20 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Memorandum of Law in Support of Trustee's Amended Motion for
an Order Confirming the Trustee's Determination of ConocoPhillips' Claims to Customer
Accounts Margined with Letters of Credit at 2, ConocoPhillips Co. v. Giddens (In re MF
Global Inc.), No. 12 Civ. 6014, (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Trustee
Memorandum], available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/
documents/file/trusteereplyl20312.pdf; Koch Memorandum, supra note 10, at 4 n.6 ("As
of the Filing Date, the Debtor was a beneficiary under a total of nine letters of credit.").
ConocoPhillips is a large oil producer, and Koch is an oil trader. See Trading, KOCH
SUPPLY & TRADING, http://www.ksandt.com/default3.asp?Section=Services&
location3=here (last visited Nov. 21, 2014); Who We Are, CONOCOPHILLIPS,
http://www.conocophillips.com/who-we-are/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
88. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 5-6.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 5.
91. See Koch Memorandum, supra note 10, at 2.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 1.
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The trustee for the MF Global bankruptcy, James W. Giddens,
returned the letters of credit to ConocoPhillips while letting Koch's
letter expire, but the trustee considered their return and expiration a
payment of customer property from the estate equal to the face value
of the letters of credit.94 This treatment meant that any amount that
MF Global's estate owed either ConocoPhillips or Koch as customer
property was reduced by the face value of the letters of credit." Thus,
ConocoPhillips' and Koch's recoveries would be reduced, and
ConocoPhillips could have even owed money to the estate if there
had been a shortfall and not enough customer property had been
recovered to cover all customer claims." Facing this reduction in its
bankruptcy recovery, ConocoPhillips moved to have the question of
the treatment of the letters of credit removed from the bankruptcy
court through "withdrawal of the reference."" ConocoPhillips argued
that a district court should consider the issue separately as "other
law," independent of the bankruptcy litigation.98 The district court
granted ConocoPhillips' motion, and this litigation began.' Koch
filed a similar motion, and the district court also granted that
motion.' Since the cases dealt with the interpretation of a CFTC
regulation on which the CFTC had already published its
interpretation, the CFTC intervened in both the ConocoPhillips and
Koch cases.'0 '
94. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 6-7; Koch Memorandum, supra note
10, at 5.
95. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 6-7; Koch Memorandum, supra note
10, at 5.
96. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 7 ("[Tlhe Trustee's [calculations], if
accepted, could result in an affirmative claim against ConocoPhillips for alleged excess
recoveries.").
97. See Memorandum of Law in Support of ConocoPhillips' Motion to Withdraw the
Reference with Respect to the Trustee's Motion to Confirm His Treatment of Letters of
Credit Provided by ConocoPhillips at 9, In re MF Global Inc., No. 11-2790 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
6, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/
file/conocomemo080612.pdf.
98. See id. at 11 ("Here, there can be no question that the CFTC Part 190 Rules, on
which the Trustee has predicated his motion, are non-title 11 'laws of the United States
regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce.' ").
99. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Giddens (In re MF Global Inc.), No. 12 Civ. 6014, 2012
WL 4757866, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2012).
100. See Koch Supply & Trading, LP v. Giddens (In re MF Global Inc.), 484 B.R. 18,
25 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
101. See Notice of Consent Motion to Intervene, Koch Supply & Trading, LP v.
Giddens, No. 12-05596 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/
groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/01 9grantingmotingl 22712.pdf; Memorandum of
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in Support of Its Consent Motion to
Intervene, Koch Supply & Trading, LP v. Giddens, No. 12-05596 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21,2012),
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B. The Parties' Arguments
Both ConocoPhillips and Koch argued that the trustee should
not have included the face value of the letters of credit as customer
property so that ConocoPhillips and Koch would receive an amount
of customer property that would not be reduced by the value of the
letters of credit." ConocoPhillips argued that, since it had not
defaulted on its letters of credit, the trustee could not have drawn on
the letters of credit." Because the trustee could not have drawn on
the letters of credit from a bank, ConocoPhillips argued, the trustee
should not have included the letters of credit in the customer
property."0 Koch made a similar argument." As the basis for this
argument, ConocoPhillips and Koch contended that the meaning of
"full proceeds" in the CFTC's regulation at 17 C.F.R. § 190.08(a) did
not mean the face value of the letter of credit." ConocoPhillips and
Koch both argued that, instead, the plain meaning of "full proceeds"
in 17 C.F.R. § 190.08 was the money that the issuing bank would pay
upon a beneficiary's draw of a letter of credit.' Thus, the trustee
must have drawn on the letters of credit before their expiration dates
by presenting them to their issuers in order to consider them part of
the customer property.'0 However, the trustee could not have done
so legally by the terms of the letters of credit because neither
ConocoPhillips nor Koch had defaulted on any margin calls."
available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/cftcmem
suppmotl22112.pdf; Notice of Unopposed Motion to Intervene, ConocoPhillips Co. v.
Giddens, No. 12-6014 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/
ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/noticemotionintervenel01912.pdf.
102. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 7-8; Koch Memorandum, supra note
10, at 1.
103. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 7-8.
104. See id. at 7.
105. See Koch Memorandum, supra note 10, at 9.
106. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 8; Koch Memorandum, supra note 10,
at 7.
107. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 9; Koch Memorandum, supra note 10,
at 8 (citing U.C.C. § 5-114(a)) ("Of course, 'proceeds' of a letter of credit are the funds
that the beneficiary receives from the issuing bank when it draws on the letter of credit.").
108. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 8; Koch Memorandum, supra note 10,
at 8-9.
109. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 4; Koch Memorandum, supra note 10,
at 2-4. ConocoPhillips made numerous other arguments: (1) that state law defines
property, and that the CFTC incorrectly defined letters of credit as customer property; (2)
that even if 17 C.F.R. § 190.08 did mean that the face value of the letters of credit were
customer property, the CFTC lacked the legal authority under the Legal Certainty for
Bank Products Act to promulgate it; and (3) that the CFTC regulation did not preempt
state law on letters of credit, particularly the UCC. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note
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In contrast, the trustee argued that the face value of the letters of
credit was customer property."o The likely purpose of this argument
was to make the estate as large as possible for customer property to
be distributed pro rata. The trustee needed to make the estate as
large as possible because, at the time of this litigation, $1.6 billion in
customer funds were missing, creating a serious shortfall in customer
property."' The trustee argued that the plain meaning of 17 C.F.R.
§ 190.08 was that the face value of the letters of credit constituted
customer property.1 2 The trustee also argued that the CFTC's
interpretation of the regulation, clarified both in its Supplementary
Information at the time of the regulation's promulgation and for its
brief in this litigation, was entitled to judicial deference." The CFTC
similarly argued that its interpretation of its own regulation was
consistent with the regulation's plain meaning and that the CFTC's
interpretation of its regulation was entitled to judicial deference
under Auer v. Robbins.114
Although the case settled, ConocoPhillips' and Koch's arguments
could have been made by any customer that posted letters of credit as
margin. In another FCM bankruptcy, it seems likely that parties
would make similar arguments. Therefore, the issue of how 17 C.F.R.
§ 190.08 should be interpreted remains relevant. The level of
deference afforded to the CFTC's interpretation of this regulation
could determine the outcome of future litigation in this area.
III. THE APPLICABLE LEVEL OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE FOR THE
CFTC's INTERPRETATION OF ITS REGULATION
The CFTC and the trustee both argued that the CFTC's
interpretation of 17 C.F.R. § 190.08 in its Supplementary Information
and in its briefs in the ConocoPhillips and Koch litigation was entitled
to strong judicial deference under Auer v. Robbins. ConocoPhillips, in
contrast, argued that neither the CFTC's brief nor its Supplementary
Information on the regulation was entitled to deference.
10, at 12, 18-19, 25-26. Koch argued that various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
prevented the trustee from treating its letter of credit as customer property. See Koch
Memorandum, supra note 10, at 12-19.
110. See Trustee Memorandum, supra note 87, at 9.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
112. See Trustee Memorandum, supra note 87, at 9-10.
113. See id. at 12-13 ("As a federal agency interpreting its own regulations, the CFTC
is entitled to substantial deference.").
114. 519 U.S. 452 (1997); see Reply Brief of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission in Support of the Trustee's Motion to Confirm, supra note 12, at 8-10.
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ConocoPhillips' argument that the CFTC interpretation should not
receive much, if any, judicial deference has some support from cases
such as Christensen v. Harris County."' Koch, oddly, argued that the
Supplementary Information was entitled to Auer deference but that it
supported Koch's interpretation of the regulation."' This
interpretation of the Supplementary Information is hard to square
with the statement in the Supplementary Information that the CFTC
rejected commentators' suggestions that "the Commission amend its
proposal to provide that letters of credit be drawn upon only in
accordance with their terms and only to the extent of the margin
owing by the depositor.""
Because ConocoPhillips' arguments on this issue are better
supported, this Part will consider only ConocoPhillips' arguments
against deference and the trustee's and the CFTC's arguments in
favor of deference to the agency's interpretation of its regulation.
This Part will not address Koch's argument. Subpart A will outline
the standard of review created by Auer and Christensen. Subpart B
will discuss the parties' arguments about the plain meaning of the
regulation to determine whether a plain meaning controls and
precludes judicial deference. Subpart C will argue that, if the
regulation is ambiguous, Auer deference should apply.
A. Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations Under Auer and
Christensen
Auer v. Robbins involved an agency's interpretation of its own
regulation and afforded the agency what some have deemed "super-
deference.""' In Auer, employees of the St. Louis Police Department
argued that they were entitled to overtime pay under the Fair Labor
Standards Act."9 The Secretary of Labor had promulgated
regulations stating that an employee must meet a certain salary basis
in order to qualify as exempt from overtime pay.120
In deciding whether the police officers were exempt, the Court
looked to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the Department
115. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
116. See Koch Memorandum, supra note 10, at 8.
117. See Supplementary Information, 48 Fed. Reg. 8716, 8718 (Mar. 1, 1983) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 190).
118. See J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to Variety with a Wink and a
Nod to Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 47 (2010).
119. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,454-55 (1997).
120. See id.
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of Labor's regulation.121 The Court reasoned that "[b]ecause the
salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary's own regulations, his
interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless
'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' "122 The
Secretary provided his opinion in an amicus brief that the Court had
requested in the course of the litigation.123 Notably, the fact that the
interpretation was given pursuant to litigation, rather than through
formal notice and comment procedures, did not bother the Court.124
The Court stated that the source of this opinion as an amicus brief did
not "make it unworthy of deference" because it was not a " 'post hoc
rationalizatio[n]' advanced by an agency seeking to defend past
agency action against attack."1 25 As long as the agency does not
engage in a post hoc rationalization of a prior action, Auer creates a
high level of deference for an agency's interpretation of its own
regulation, regardless of what form that interpretation takes.
Christensen v. Harris County involved a very similar fact pattern
to Auer, but the Court in Christensen took a step away from Auer's
broad deference. 126 Christensen limits deference in cases where a
regulation has an unambiguous meaning that contrasts with the
agency's interpretation.' In Christensen, employees of a sheriff's
department argued that Harris County's policy requiring employees
to schedule time off in order to reduce accrued compensatory time
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act.'2 In response to the litigation,
the Department of Labor issued an opinion letter stating that, under
its interpretation of its regulations, this policy violated the
regulations.12 9
Despite the factual similarity of this case to Auer, the Court
distinguished Auer, stating that "Auer deference is warranted only
when the language of the regulation is ambiguous. The regulation in
this case, however, is not ambiguous."'30 The Court stated that the
agency in this case was merely "[s]eeking to overcome the
121. See id. at 461.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See Goering, supra note 118, at 49 ("What set Auer apart was that it granted
super-deference to an informal agency interpretation expressed in an amicus brief that the
Court had specifically requested.").
125. Auer, 519 U.S. at 462.
126. See Goering, supra note 118, at 52.
127. See id.
128. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 578 (2000).
129. See id. at 586.
130. Id. at 588.
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regulation's obvious meaning" by asserting that Auer deference
applied.13 ' In determining that the regulation was unambiguous, the
Court conducted its own interpretation of the regulation and the
statute it implemented.3 2 If the regulation is unambiguous, then an
agency's informal interpretation of it is entitled to less deference, and
courts should consider the agency's interpretation only to the extent
that it has the "power to persuade." 3 3 Although the formality of the
agency interpretation was not at issue in Auer, lower courts have
interpreted Christensen to mean that strong deference to agency
interpretations should not apply to an agency's informal
interpretations.'" After Christensen, the formality of an agency
interpretation may affect the level of deference it will receive.
However, in the wake of both Christensen and Auer, the main
question to answer in deciding which level of deference to apply to an
informal agency interpretation is whether the regulation contains an
unambiguous plain meaning.
B. The Plain Meaning of "Proceeds" in 17 C.F.R. § 190.08
To determine whether the CFTC's interpretation is entitled to
strong deference under Auer or much weaker deference under
Christensen, the regulation must be defined as either ambiguous or
unambiguous. ConocoPhillips and Koch argued that 17 C.F.R.
§ 190.08 had a plain meaning that was the opposite of the trustee's
contended plain meaning.'
Both ConocoPhillips and Koch invoked the definition of
"proceeds" in U.C.C. § 5-114(a), which defines the proceeds of a
letter of credit as "the cash, check, accepted draft, or other item of
value paid or delivered upon honor or giving of value by the
issuer."13 This definition could support their position because it refers
to the issuer's action of honoring the letter in defining "proceeds" of a
131. See id.
132. See id.; Goering, supra note 118, at 52.
133. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
134. See Naaman Asir Fiola, Note, Christensen v. Harris County: Pumping Chevron
for All It's Worth-Defining the Limits of Chevron Deference, 21 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN.
L. JUDGES 151, 168-69 (2001) (stating that courts interpreting Christensen have held that
informal agency interpretations were not entitled to Chevron deference); see also Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (establishing
deference for agency decisions where Congress has not "directly spoken to the precise
question at issue" and the agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 102-12.
136. U.C.C. § 5-114(a) (2013); see ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 8-9; Koch
Memorandum, supra note 10, at 8.
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letter of credit. ConocoPhillips further argued that the term
"proceeds" was not defined by the Bankruptcy Code and that, since
Congress has left the determination of property rights to states, state
law under the UCC should govern its meaning.137
However, ConocoPhillips' argument has weaknesses. The state-
law definition under the UCC does not necessarily apply to a
bankruptcy issue regulated by the CFTC, especially when the CFTC's
own interpretation differs from the UCC definition.'
ConocoPhillips' argument also uses the UCC state law definition of
letter of credit proceeds to argue that the UCC and state law should
govern.'3 9 The UCC does not extend its own jurisdiction that far,'" so
ConocoPhillips' argument as to the plain meaning of "full proceeds"
in 17 C.F.R. § 190.08 receives little support from the UCC.
ConocoPhillips also argued that the letters of credit it posted
expired by the time the bankruptcy trustee could have drawn on
them, so they were not part of customer property in the bankruptcy.14'
If this argument prevailed, then the pace and timing of bankruptcy
litigation could mean that any customer's letter of credit could expire
by its terms before a bankruptcy trustee would have the chance to
draw on it. This argument contradicts policy consideration of fairness
because it would mean that any letter of credit a customer posted
could be exempted from constituting customer property in
bankruptcy.
The trustee's argument that the plain meaning of "full proceeds"
is the face value of the letter of credit is more convincing and logical.
The trustee argued that ConocoPhillips' definition would mean that it
would be ultimately impossible for a letter of credit to be customer
property.142 If a letter of credit in bankruptcy can only be drawn on
according to its terms, then the only event that would allow the
trustee to draw on the letter of credit would be a default triggered by
ConocoPhillips' failure to meet a margin call.143 MF Global, through
the trustee, would then have to declare a default, liquidate
137. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 9.
138. See Supplementary Information, 48 Fed. Reg. 8716, 8718 (Mar. 1, 1983) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 190).
139. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 9.
140. See U.C.C. § 5-102 (2002) cmt. (stating that the purpose of this provision of the
UCC is to "indicate that the rules stated are not intended to be exhaustive of the law
applicable to letters of credit").
141. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 9.
142. See Trustee Memorandum, supra note 87, at 9-10.
143. See id. at 9.
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ConocoPhillips' commodity futures positions, and only then access
ConocoPhillips' margin if it suffered a loss in the liquidation.'" The
trustee would then go to the issuer of the letters of credit and draw on
them, but the trustee would be drawing on them only to make MF
Global whole. 45 The "proceeds" in that case would not be customer
property at all since the funds would no longer rightfully belong to
any customer.'" Logically, the CFTC would not give the term
"proceeds" a meaning that would preclude a letter of credit from ever
constituting customer property in a bankruptcy. The argument that
"proceeds" means the face value of a letter of credit is stronger than
than ConocoPhillips' or Koch's arguments in favor of their
interpretation of the plain meaning. Thus, if the regulation does have
a plain meaning, the trustee's meaning seems the more likely and
reasonable interpretation.
C. The CFTC's Interpretation of Its Regulation Should Receive Auer
Deference
As demonstrated above, if the regulation has a plain meaning,
the trustee has the more convincing argument for the plain meaning
of "proceeds" as "face value" of a letter of credit. ConocoPhillips'
and Koch's arguments seem at least credible, though, if weaker, so a
court may find that the regulation was ambiguous. The district court,
in granting Koch's motion to withdraw the reference from the
bankruptcy court, stated that, "[r]egardless of CFTC intent, the
regulation speaks only in terms of 'full proceeds,' and not 'face
value.' "" Thus, "more than a simple and straightforward application
of the language of Regulation 190.08(a)(i)(1)(E) would be required
for the Trustee to prevail."' 48 Although the court rejected the
trustee's argument as to the plain meaning of "full proceeds," the
court's statement indicated that a court would have to do more than
simply apply the plain meaning of that term in order to rule in the
case. Based on this district court's opinion, it seems likely that a court
would find the plain meaning of "full proceeds" ambiguous. If a court
found the regulation ambiguous, the court should grant the CFTC
144. See id.
145. See id. at 9-10.
146. See id. at 10.
147. Koch Supply & Trading, LP v. Giddens (In re MF Global Inc.), 484 B.R. 18, 24(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
148. Id.
295
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Auer deference and defer to the agency's interpretation of its own
regulation.
There were two informal agency interpretations involved in this
case. First, there was the 1983 Supplementary Information that the
CFTC published prior to promulgating this regulation. 14 9 In the
Supplementary Information, the CFTC described the meaning of "full
proceeds" in a manner consistent with the trustee's interpretation
here.5 0 Second, there were the CFTC's briefs as an intervener in both
the ConocoPhillips and Koch litigations."s' In its briefs, the CFTC
clarified that its interpretation of the regulation was consistent with
the trustee's position and with the 1983 Supplementary
Information.'52 The Supplementary Information is arguably somewhat
formal because it addressed comments that the CFTC received in the
notice and comment process for promulgating 17 C.F.R. § 190.08.153
Although formality may be required for deference under Christensen,
it is not required for Auer deference, and even a brief prepared for
some particular litigation can meet the requirements of Auer.15 4
ConocoPhillips argued that, because the regulation is
unambiguous, the Supplementary Information is an attempt by. the
CFTC to rewrite the regulation it adopted.' However, the timing of
the writing prior to the promulgation of the regulation belies this
argument. If the CFTC had wanted a different meaning for the
regulation, it could have written one at that time. As the trustee
argued, the CFTC "gave extensive time for public comment,
considered from public commentators the exact position that
ConocoPhillips puts forth today, sought advice from multiple sources
on the best path forward, and then rejected the ConocoPhillips
position with sound policy considerations."'56 The consistency
between the CFTC's current interpretation of the regulation and its
interpretation in its Supplementary Information also supports the
149. See Supplementary Information, 48 Fed. Reg. 8716, 8718 (Mar. 1, 1983) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 190).
150. See id.
151. See Reply Brief of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in Support of the
Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 12, at 4-5; Reply Brief of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission in Support of the Trustee's Motion to Confirm,
supra note 12, at 9.
152. See id.
153. See Supplementary Information, 48 Fed. Reg. 8716, 8718 (Mar. 1, 1983) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 190).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 123-25.
155. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 15-17.
156. Trustee Memorandum, supra note 87, at 13.
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argument that the interpretation is not a post hoc rationalization for
past agency action.' Rather, from the time of the regulation's
promulgation to thirty years later, the CFTC's interpretation of its
regulation has remained the same.
One potential issue that might have prevented a court from
applying Auer deference is that Auer deference has lost favor in the
wake of Christensen and subsequent decisions that have limited
Auer's application. 5 8 However, "the Court continues to apply Auer
deference when an agency interprets its own regulations."' Thus, at
least at the time of this litigation, courts would have been likely to
apply Auer deference to these facts and defer to the CFTC's
interpretation of 17 C.F.R. § 190.08.
A court interpreting 17 C.F.R. § 190.08 should hold that the
regulation either has the plain meaning that the CFTC and the trustee
advocated, or it should find that the CFTC's interpretation of the
regulation is entitled to Auer deference. The CFTC's interpretation is
not a post hoc rationalization, so Auer deference should apply if the
regulation is ambiguous.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MF GLOBAL LITIGATION AND THE ISSUE
OF LETTERS OF CREDIT AS CUSTOMER PROPERTY
Although this case settled before a court could rule on the many
issues at stake in the litigation, the issue of whether letters of credit
posted as margin constitute customer property in bankruptcy
continues to be relevant. Even if Auer deference had not applied, a
court should have found for the trustee based on persuasive policy
arguments. Subpart A discusses the policy arguments in favor of
deeming the face value of a letter of credit to be customer property.
Subpart B discusses the possible implications this treatment of letters
of credit could have on letter of credit law generally.
A. Policy Arguments in Favor of the Face Value of a Letter of Credit
Constituting Customer Property
Several policy arguments favor treating the face value of a letter
of credit as customer property. One reason that bankruptcy trustees
should be able to draw letters of credit at face value is that letters of
157. See supra text accompanying note 125.
158. See Fiola, supra note 134, at 168-69 (discussing the impact of Christensen on lower
courts and arguing that Christensen has had the effect.of limiting deference to agency
opinions).
159. See Goering,supra note 118, at 50.
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credit function like cash when they are posted as margin. Both the
CFTC and the trustee in this litigation recognized that letters of credit
function in the exact same way as cash for margin purposes.'" Unlike
other forms of non-cash margin, letters of credit allow a trader to
borrow dollar-for-dollar with any amount that the face value of the
letter of credit states.'6 1 Thus, in fairness, a letter of credit that is
worth its face value as margin should also be worth its face value as
customer property in bankruptcy. Giving letters of credit an
advantage over other types of non-cash margin, which are included in
customer property, also seems unfair, as the CFTC recognized in
drafting its regulation.162
Based on the use of letters of credit as margin, the CFTC
determined that making letters of credit constitute customer property
at their face value would have benefits for clearinghouses as well,
even if such a rule discouraged the use of letters of credit.' 6 The
CFTC even asked some clearinghouses whether they would prefer to
have letters of credit constitute customer property at their face value
or have letters of credit drawn only according to their terms.'6 Those
clearinghouses responded that they would prefer to be able to draw
letters of credit at face value, regardless of their terms and regardless
of whether traders had used the letters as original margin or as
variation margin.'6 Clearinghouses worried that if they had to consult
the terms of a letter of credit to draw on it in the case of the
bankruptcy of an FCM, then they might not be able to obtain
payment of any amounts they were ultimately owed.'" This possibility
could "hamper[] the viability of [letters of credit] as margin
deposits."'6
The clearinghouses' concern also relates to a fundamental
principle of letter of credit law. A letter of credit is a documentary
payment mechanism, meaning that the obligation of the issuer to pay
is "triggered by the presentation of [the letter], not the happening of
160. See Trustee Memorandum, supra note 87, at 14.
161. See id. at 4.
162 See Supplementary Information, 48 Fed. Reg. 8716, 8718-19 (Mar. 1, 1983) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 190).
163. See id. at 8718.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Id.
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an event."' 8 Thus, the presentation of the letter of credit to the
issuing bank would trigger the obligation to pay for the issuer of a
commodity trader's letter of credit."9 The FCM presenting the letter
of credit would not have to prove the actual default of the
customer.17 0 The fact that letters of credit create a documentary
obligation makes them "swift and certain payment mechanisms"
because the presenter does not have to prove any underlying facts to
the issuer to receive payment."' Making a letter of credit payable in
the bankruptcy of an FCM even beyond the letter's terms supports
the use of letters of credit as certain payment mechanisms that
deserve to be considered as good as cash. In light of the advantages of
letters of credit generally, it seems logical that clearinghouses would
support the CFTC's rule ensuring the swift and certain function of
letters of credit as payment mechanisms.
Lastly, excluding letters of credit from customer property in
bankruptcy would give preference to large FCM customers over small
customers. Out of MF Global's thousands of customers,
ConocoPhillips and Koch were two of only nine large customers that
MF Global allowed to post letters of credit as margin.'7 2 Thus, only
the largest commodity traders can post letters of credit as margin.173
The CFTC recognized when it promulgated 17 C.F.R. § 190.08 that, if
the face value of letters of credit was not included in customer
property, large traders would have an unfair advantage over smaller
traders in recovering their property following the bankruptcy of a
commodity broker.'74 The CFTC also cited statutory authority
supporting its position that the law should not give large customers
advantages over smaller customers in bankruptcy."
When so many policy arguments stack up in favor of treating
letters of credit as customer property at face value, the fact that this
168. Gerald T. McLaughlin, Remembering the Bay of Pigs: Using Letters of Credit to
Facilitate the Resolution of International Disputes, 32 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 743, 752
(2004).
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
173. See Supplementary Information, 48 Fed. Reg. 8716, 8719 (Mar. 1, 1983) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 190).
174. See id.
175. See id. (stating that giving an advantage to large customers "would contravene the
spirit and intent of the [Bankruptcy] Code's limitations on the return of specifically
identifiable property which were intended to assure parity between customers with
margining power and those without it").
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case settled becomes troubling. The settlement of this case shows that
a large commodity trader, like ConocoPhillips, can potentially avoid
having the full face value of its letters of credit included in customer
property by bringing suit. The outcome of this case thus could
encourage other large traders to fight to escape this liability in the
future.
B. The Effect on Letter of Credit Law of Treating the Full Face
Value of a Letter of Credit as Customer Property
Letters of credit are commonly used in financial transactions, so
the treatment of letters of credit in an FCM bankruptcy could have an
impact on letter of credit law generally. "There are as many uses of
standby [letters of credit] as there are commercial transactions
requiring third-party assurance of payment.""' Financial standby
letters of credit, such as those at issue in the MF Global liquidation,
account for more than eighty-five percent of outstanding standbys."'
With the prevalence of standby letters of credit, the CFTC's
interpretation of its regulation that the full face value of a letter of
credit constitutes customer property could have a broader impact on
letter of credit law.
ConocoPhillips made a final argument that even if the CFTC's
interpretation of 17 C.F.R. § 190.08 were enforceable, some of their
letters of credit still should not constitute customer property in the
MF Global litigation because the letters had expired. 7 1
ConocoPhillips argued that the CFTC's position in the litigation
would mean that "letters of credit never expire."'7 9 Ignoring the terms
of letters of credit, including their expiration dates, could certainly
make letters of credit less appealing to use as margin in commodity
deals. In 1983, the CFTC recognized this potential but showed little
concern over discouraging the use of letters of credit as margin and
even stated that this discouragement could be positive.'" Letters of
credit were "not subject to banking reserve requirements and [could]
be uncollateralized," and the CFTC expressed concern that banks
could too freely issue letters of credit, implying that the unrestricted
issuance of standby letters of credit could destabilize banks.'"'
176. Uses of Letters of Credit (Nonsales Transactions), supra note 64, § 1:23.
177. See id.
178. See ConocoPhillips Brief, supra note 10, at 31.
179. Id. at 33.
180. See Supplementary Information, 48 Fed. Reg. 8716, 8718-19 (Mar. 1, 1983) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 190).
181. See id.
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In recent years, though, the use of "structured" or "syndicated"
letters of credit has arisen in commodity futures trading.'" A
syndicated letter of credit involves multiple issuers. 83 Generally one
bank serves as the lead bank or agent, and each issuer is liable only
for its pro rata share of the face amount of the credit.'8" With
structured letters of credit, commodity brokers use their leverage to
provide financing to banks.'" In the MF Global litigation, the CFTC
argued consistently with its 1983 opinion that the face value of all the
letters of credit should constitute customer property, regardless of
their terms."' The CFTC has generally remained opposed to the use
of letters of credit as margin and has prohibited their use as margin
for swaps. 87  However, the CFTC's traditional position of
discouraging the use of letters of credit may require further
justification now that commodity brokers are using letters of credit in
new and complex contexts. Discouraging the use of letters of credit in
commodity transactions by increasing bankruptcy liability could
reduce investment, creating a larger negative economic impact.
On the other hand, discouraging the use of letters of credit as
margin might not have a major negative economic impact on any of
the entities engaged in futures trading. Clearinghouses might not
object to decreased use of letters of credit as margin as long as the
number of trades that occur on exchanges does not significantly
decline as a result. Since only the largest customers can use letters of
credit as margin, the number of trades affected may not be great in
proportion to the total number of trades. FCMs could have more
reason to object to the CFTC's position because their biggest
customers could take trades off of regulated exchanges and into over-
the-counter derivatives or other types of investments if letters of
credit became less appealing as a form of margin. However, FCMs
might still retain these customers' business by serving as brokers to
these unregulated transactions. Thus, a reduction in the use of letters
of credit as margin could have a relatively small effect on investment
in relation to its policy benefits.
Despite the possible negative impact on investment, the CFTC's
position overall still seems preferable in light of the strong policy
182. See Uses of Letters of Credit (Nonsales Transactions), supra note 64.
183. See McLaughlin, supra note 168, at 755.
184. See id.
185. See Uses of Letters of Credit (Nonsales Transactions), supra note 64.
186. See Reply Brief of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in Support of the
Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 12, at 1.
187. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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considerations in its favor. When standby letters of credit are "as
good as cash,"'" it makes sense to treat them the same as cash in the
bankruptcy of an FCM. Allowing letters of credit to be honored past
their expiration date in a bankruptcy could have a chilling effect on
the use of letters of credit in commodity transactions. However, this
negative effect may be outweighed by the benefit of ensuring that
letters of credit remain reliable payment instruments in commodity
transactions. ConocoPhillips' and Koch's arguments seem weak in the
context of the use of letters of credit overall in commodity
transactions.
CONCLUSION
The MF Global liquidation was one of the largest bankruptcies in
U.S. history. Though another FCM collapse on this scale may not
happen in the near future, commodity brokers do face bankruptcy
with some regularity. The chance that an FCM will go bankrupt while
in possession of customers' letters of credit thus seems fairly high.
When this issue arises again, the CFTC's interpretation of its
regulation should prevail in any litigation. The position the trustee
took in the MF Global liquidation-that the face value of letters of
credit constitutes customer property-is legally correct and is
supported by strong policy arguments. Letters of credit are as good as
cash when used as margin, and they should be as good as cash in
bankruptcy. A contrary rule would give an unfair advantage to large
traders over small traders. ConocoPhillips and Koch raised creative
but unpersuasive arguments in their attempts to avoid having millions
of dollars in letters of credit included in customer property during MF
Global's liquidation. The settlement of this litigation leaves the
CFTC's regulation on letters of credit open to similar future attack.
VALERIE M. HUGHES"
188. See Paul R. Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25 STAN. L.
REv. 716, 720 (1973) ("[It is the 'hallmark' of the letter of credit that at a certain point it
becomes as good as cash.").
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